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a b s t r a c t
This study derives reduced-form equations for the wage–wage Phillips curve and the price–price Phillips
curve from ﬁrms' optimizing behavior, under the assumptions that ﬁrms pay efﬁciency wages and that
workers' expectations of average wages or prices are partly adaptive.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction

2. A model of the wage–wage Phillips curve

While the Phillips curve has been an important part of empirical
macroeconomic modeling since the publication of Phillips' (1958)
seminal paper, it has been a challenge to provide theoretical
justiﬁcation for it. This study demonstrates that a Phillips curve can
be derived from the proﬁt-maximizing behavior of ﬁrms if it is
assumed that ﬁrms pay efﬁciency wages and that, in making decisions
that affect their efﬁciency, workers' expectations of wages at other
ﬁrms or of the price level are partly adaptive. A wage–wage Phillips
curve is derived if it is assumed that efﬁciency depends on relative
wages, and a price–price Phillips curve is derived if it is assumed that
efﬁciency depends on real wages. The framework developed in this
study differs from the New Keynesian Phillips curve in that all ﬁrms
can change wages and prices each period, and it differs from Mankiw
and Reis' (2002) sticky information model in that the informational
imperfection lies in workers' expectations of average wages or prices,
rather than in ﬁrms' expectations of optimal prices.

In deriving the wage–wage Phillips curve, the following assumptions
are made:
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1. Workers' efﬁciency depends on the ratio of their current wage to
their expectations of wages at other ﬁrms and on the unemployment rate. Thus, efﬁciency can be expressed as


e
e = e Wt = W t ; ut with eW N 0; eu N 0; eWW b 0; eWu b 0;

ð1Þ

__
where Wt is the wage at a worker's current ﬁrm, W et denotes workers'
expectations of the average wage rate (to be deﬁned more rigorously
below), and ut represents the unemployment rate.1
2. As in Campbell (2008a), it is assumed that workers have imperfect
information about average wages and that their expectations of average wages are a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations. In particular, expectations are assumed to be a geometric weighted average
1
Reasons given for a positive relationship between wages and productivity include
the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the morale models of Akerlof (1982)
and Akerlof and Yellen (1990), the labor turnover models of Stiglitz (1974), Schlicht
(1978), and Salop (1979), and the adverse selection model of Weiss (1980). Campbell
(2006, 2008a) discusses justiﬁcation for the assumption that eWu b 0.
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of the actual current average wage and last period's average wage adjusted by a geometric weighted average of past wage inﬂation, so that
"
ω

e

W t = W t W t−1

W t−1
W t−2

!λ

1

W t−2
W t−3

!λ

2

⋯

W t−T
W t−T−1

!λ #1−ω
T

ð2Þ

with λ1 + λ2 + ⋯ + λT = 1;

D

 −γ
Pt
;
Pt

ð3Þ

where P is the ﬁrm's price, P ̅ is the aggregate price level, γ is the
price elasticity of demand, and Y is real aggregate demand per
ﬁrm, which is assumed to be determined from the constant
velocity speciﬁcation, Yt = Mt / P t̅ , where M is nominal demand.
Solving Eq. (3) for Pt and multiplying by Q t yields the following
equation for total revenue:
1

γ−1

Pt Q t = Ytγ Q t γ Pt :
4. Firms produce output (Q) with the Cobb–Douglas production function,
Qt =

ϕ ϕ 1−ϕ 
e
At Lt K0 e Wt =W t ;

ut

ϕ

;

ð4Þ

Given the model's assumptions, proﬁts in period t can be expressed as
1h
ϕ iγ−1
ϕ ϕ 1−ϕ 
e
γ
P t −Wt Lt −rK0 :
Π = Y γt At Lt K0 e Wt = Wt ; ut

ð5Þ

Differentiating Eq. (5) with respect to Lt, setting the derivative
equal to 0, and solving for Lt yields the following expression for labor
demand:
γ



γ
1
ð1−ϕÞðγ−1Þ
ϕðγ−1Þ
ϕðγ−1Þ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ
Yt
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K0
γ
ϕðγ−1Þ

Þ ϕðγ−1Þ ð1−ϕÞðγ−1Þ
ϕðγ−1Þ
dΠ
ϕðγ−1Þ γ1 ϕðγ−1
1
−1
=0=
eW ½• e P t −Lt :
Yt At γ Lt γ K0 γ e½• γ
dWt
γ
Wt

ð7Þ


−1 
 1
e
e
eW Wt = W t ; ut
Wt e Wt =W t ; ut
e = 1:
Wt

γ


 − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ
e
× e Wt =W t ; ut
Pt
:

ð6Þ

2
Campbell (2008a) discusses justiﬁcation for the assumption that expectations are
a mixture of rational and adaptive expectations, based on previous studies that
examine the nature of agents' expectations. It should be noted that Campbell (2008a)
uses a simpler speciﬁcation in which expectations are a weighted average of the actual
current average wage and last period's average wage. However, the speciﬁcation used
in the present study is more appropriate for an economy in which wages tend to rise
over time.
3
Assuming a positive relationship between wages and efﬁciency does not guarantee
that there will be excess supply of labor. Whether a ﬁrm operates on its labor supply
curve or to the left of its labor supply curve (i.e., pays an efﬁciency wage) depends on
the elasticity of output with respect to the wage, calculated at the market-clearing
wage. It is assumed that parameters are chosen so that ﬁrms maximize proﬁts by
operating to the left of their labor supply curves.

ð8Þ

Totally differentiating Eq. (8) and dividing by the original equation
yields


W
e
W
0 = 1−e−1 eW t e + WW t e Ŵ t
eW W t
Wt




W
e
W P̂
e
−1
+ −1 + e−1 eW t e − WW t e W et + Wu −e eu dut ;
eW W t
eW
Wt
P̂

e

ð9Þ

e

where Ŵt = dWt / Wt and W et = dW t = W t . The above equation can be
viewed as the relationship between percentage deviations in Wt,
P
percentage deviations in W et , and absolute deviations in ut from their
P
initial equilibrium values. If we consider small deviations of W, W e, and
u from their initial equilibrium values, we can treat the coefﬁcients on
these variables as constants, with these constants determined by the
P
steady-state values of Wt, W et , e, eW, eu, eWW, and eWu. In a steady-state
Pe
Pe
− 1
equilibrium, Wt = W t and ee
W = (Wt / W t ) = 1 (from Eq. (8)). These
substitutions allow Eq. (9) to be expressed as
P̂e

where A represents technology (assumed to be exogenous and
labor augmenting), L represents labor, and K represents capital
(assumed to be ﬁxed).
5. Labor supply per ﬁrm is N(Wt/P te̅ ), where P te̅ is the expected price
level. It is assumed that parameters are such that ﬁrms pay efﬁciency
wages, yielding excess supply of labor.3

Lt = Wt ϕðγ−1Þ−γ

The other ﬁrst-order condition is

If Eq. (6) is substituted into Eq. (7), the following condition, which
is analogous to the Solow (1979) condition, is obtained:

where ω represents the degree to which expectations are rational,
and the λ's represent the weights given to the various lags of
wage inﬂation in forming adaptive expectations.2
3. Each ﬁrm faces a downward-sloping demand curve in the product
market of the following form:
Q t = Yt

243

Ŵ t = W t +

eu −eWu
dut :
eWW

ð10Þ

If Eq. (2) is totally differentiated and divided by the original
equation, we obtain the following expression for percentage deviations from steady-state values:
"
#
P̂
T
P̂
P̂
P̂
W t = ωW t + ð1−ωÞ W t−1 + ∑ λi W t−i −W t−i−1 :

P̂e

i=1

ð11Þ

Substituting Eq. (11) into Eq. (10) and aggregating across ﬁrms
yields
P̂ P̂
W t −W t−1 =

P̂
T
P̂
eu −eWu
dut + ∑ λi W t−i −W t−i−1
ð1−ωÞeWW
i=1

with λ1 + λ2 +

⋯ + λT

ð12Þ

= 1:

Thus, the model produces a reduced-form relationship between
current wage inﬂation, unemployment, and a weighted average of
lagged wage inﬂation with the weights summing to 1. Since eu N 0,
eWu b 0, and eWW b 0, the coefﬁcient on the unemployment rate is
unambiguously negative.4 Also, since Eq. (12) is a reduced-form
relationship, the coefﬁcients on unemployment and lagged wage
inﬂation will be the same for both demand shocks and technology
shocks and will be the same for any process governing the shocks
(e.g., stochastic or deterministic).
Eq. (12) is an expression for the wage–wage Phillips curve.
However, Phillips curves are generally estimated by regressing either
wage inﬂation or price inﬂation on unemployment and lagged price
inﬂation.5 Campbell (2008b) demonstrates that the model developed
4
In the model of Campbell (2008a), wage inﬂation depends negatively on
unemployment at the national level. In this previous study, however, wage inﬂation
does not depend on lagged wage inﬂation (nor on lagged price inﬂation).
5
It is not clear why there is not more empirical work that involves estimating
wage–wage Phillips curves.
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in this section yields asymptotic wage–price and price–price Phillips
curves in response to stochastic aggregate demand shocks. In these
versions of the Phillips curve, the coefﬁcient on lagged price inﬂation
asymptotically approaches 1 as the sample size increases, and it is
close to 1 even when the sample size is small.
3. A model of the price–price Phillips curve
In deriving the wage–wage Phillips curve, it is assumed that
workers' efﬁciency depends on the ratio between their wages and
their expectations of average wages. It could also be assumed that
their efﬁciency depends on the ratio between their wages and their
expectations of the price level. While efﬁciency should depend on
relative wages in the long run, there are two reasons why workers'
efﬁciency may depend on their expectations of the price level in the
short run. First, in the fair wage model of Akerlof and Yellen (1990),
workers may view the fair wage as a function of the real wage. Second,
even if workers are concerned about their relative wages, they may
use information about price inﬂation to predict how much wages are
rising at other ﬁrms, since wage inﬂation and price inﬂation are
correlated and since price inﬂation data are more highly publicized
than wage inﬂation data.6
If efﬁciency depends on price expectations, Eqs. (4), (6), (8), and
(10) become

ϕ ϕ

1−ϕ

Q t = At Lt K0

Lt = W t

γ
ϕðγ−1Þ−γ


ϕ
e
e Wt =P t ; ut ;

ð13Þ



γ
1
ϕðγ−1Þ
ð1−ϕÞðγ−1Þ
ϕðγ−1Þ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ
Yt
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K0
γ
ϕðγ−1Þ

e

Ŵ t = P̂ t +

ð15Þ

ð16Þ

The unemployment rate can be expressed as ut = [N(Wt / P ̅et ) − Lt]/
N(Wt / P ̅et ). Letting sL equal the steady-state value of Lt / N(Wt / P ̅et ) and
ψ represent the steady-state value of the short-run labor supply
elasticity (with ψ ≥ 0), dut can be approximated by

dut =

"
#
e
−dLt
Wt
−2 ′ 1
e
dW
−
dP
≈−sL L̂ t + sL ψŴ t −sL ψ P̂ t :
+ Lt N N
t
t
e
e 2
N
Pt
Pt

ð17Þ

From Eqs. (13)–(17), it can be demonstrated that

e

P̂ t = P̂ t −
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P t−1
P t−2

!λ

1

P t−2
P t−3
"

!λ

2

⋯

P t−T
P t−T−1

!λ #1−ω
T

;


T
e
and P̂ t = ω P̂ t + ð1−ωÞ P̂ t−1 + ∑ λi P̂ t−i− P̂ t−i−1

ð19Þ
#

i=1

with λ1 + λ2 + ⋯ + λT = 1:
Substituting Eq. (19) into Eq. (18) results in the Phillips curve
relationship:
−1

ð1−ϕÞ½eWW −sL ðeu −eWu Þð1 + ψÞ + ϕe eu sL eWW
P̂ t − P̂ t−1 = −
dut
ð1−ωÞsL eWW

T
ϕ
+ ∑ λi P̂ t−i −P̂ t−i−1 −
Â :
1−ω t
i=1

ð20Þ
Thus, if workers' efﬁciency depends on their wages relative to their
expectations of the price level, a reduced-form equation for the price–
price Phillips curve can be derived. In this equation, the sum of
coefﬁcients on lagged inﬂation equals 1, the coefﬁcient on unemployment is negative (since 1 − ϕ N 0, eu N 0, eWW b 0, eWu b 0, ψ ≥ 0, and
1 − ω N 0), and the rate of price inﬂation depends both on the
unemployment rate and on technology shocks.
4. Conclusion

γ

eu −eWu
dut :
eWW

"
e
Pt

ð14Þ


 − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ − ϕðγ−1Þ−γ
e
× e Wt =P t ; ut
Pt
;

−1 
1
e
e
eW Wt = P t ; ut e = 1; and
Wt e Wt =P t ; ut
Pt

Similar to the assumption about wage expectations, workers'
expectations about the price level are assumed to be a mixture of
rational and adaptive expectations, so that

ð1−ϕÞ½eWW −sL ðeu −eWu Þð1 + ψÞ + ϕe−1 eu sL eWW
7
dut −ϕ Ât : ð18Þ
sL eWW

6
Workers' efﬁciency probably depends on both average wages and average prices in
the short run, although there has been little examination of this issue.
7
An appendix deriving this equation is available at http://www.niu.edu/econ/
Directory/Campbell/PhillipsPaperELAppendix.pdf.

This study assumes that ﬁrms pay efﬁciency wages and that
workers' expectations of average wages or prices are a mixture of
rational and adaptive expectations. It is demonstrated that the proﬁtmaximizing behavior of ﬁrms results in a wage–wage Phillips curve
when workers' efﬁciency depends on their wages relative to their
expectations of average wages and results in a price–price Phillips
curve when their efﬁciency depends on their wages relative to their
expectations of the price level.
This study considers the proﬁt-maximization problem of ﬁrms and
does not explicitly model the behavior of workers. Two decisions
made by workers that are relevant to a ﬁrm's wage and employment
choices are their decisions concerning labor supply and efﬁciency. In a
simple leisure-consumption framework, workers' utility maximization yields a relationship between real wages and labor supply, as
assumed in this study. In addition, Campbell (2006) demonstrates
that an effort function with eW N 0, eu N 0, eWW b 0, and eWu b 0 can be
derived from workers' utility-maximizing behavior. Thus, the Phillips
curves derived in this study can be viewed as being determined from
proﬁt maximization and utility maximization.
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